DOUBLE dissolution election is a not likely to be a remedy for the woes of the Rudd Government, despite the mutterings of a least one back-bencher.
The Senate has knocked back the Government’s luxury car tax and it is likely to knock back a few more budget measures. Moreover, this hostile Senate has nearly three years to run.
One might well think that the Government would be tempted to re-submit the luxury car tax so it has a trigger for a double dissolution and then to go ahead with a double dissolution if, in the words of Paul Keating, the “unrepresentative swill” remains recalcitrant.
However, there are solid constitutional, electoral and political reasons why it is extremely unlikely that the Government would choose that path.
First to the constitutional reasons. If the government pushed for a double dissolution this year or in the first half of next year it would put the electoral cycle out of sync and deny the Government – if it won – the option of a full three-year term after the dissolution.
This is a bit complicated, but let me explain the effect of the constitutional provisions. In ordinary half Senate elections, the senators’ terms start on the first day of July after the election. However, the Constitution provides that, in the case of a double dissolution, the senators will be deemed to have taken their seats on the first day of July PRECEDING the election. Further, the Constitution provides that senators must be elected some time in the 12 months preceding the expiry of their term.
It would mean that, if you were to have a normal Senate and House of Representatives election at the same time, the House of Representatives election following the double dissolution would have to shy of the full three-year term by as many months as the double dissolution was after July.
For example, a March 2009 double dissolution (nine months after July) would require the following election to be held before June 2011 (nine months shy of the natural three-year term to March 2012).
In the 28 April 1951 double dissolution Robert Menzies lost 10 months from his next term.
In the 1987 double dissolution, Bob Hawke hardly lost anything from his subsequent term because the election was in July anyway.
The broad point is that the further from July the double dissolution the more a Government loses from its subsequent term. The closer to July the less you lose, but the more likely it is you have an election in winter, which voters do not like.
The alternative is to have a separate half-Senate election. The only time that has happened (1970) the voters punished the Government.
After the 18 May 1974 double dissolution, Gough Whitlam was sacked before he had a chance to suffer the 11-month contraction of the subsequent term.
In the other three double dissolutions since federation, 1914, 1975 and 1983 the Government lost (counting Whitlam’s Labor as the Government in 1975).
The fact that half the time the Government lost is another reason not to have a double dissolution.
And now for the electoral argument. Labour has a lot to gain by waiting for the natural term of the Senate to expire. In an ordinary election in late 2010 or early 2011, the Coalition would be defending its half-Senate election result of 2004. In that election the Coalition won 21 Senate seats with a term expiring on 30 June, 2011. Labor won a mere 16, the Greens two and Family First one.
With 21 Coalition senators retiring and only 16 Labor senators retiring, you would expect Labor to win a few seats from the Coalition. You would expect it to be very difficult for the Coalition to repeat its 2004 vote. Remember, in 2004 Labor was led by Mark Latham and the Coalition by a then very strong John Howard.
The other electoral point that militates against a double dissolution is that 12 senators are elected in each state, not six. This means that the quota to obtain a seat is a mere 7.7 per cent of the vote, as against 14.3 per cent of the vote in an ordinary half-Senate election.
In each of the past two half-Senate elections the major parties took clean sweeps of three states. They could not repeat this at a double dissolution. It would be almost inevitable that at least one, possibly two, independent or minor party senators would win a seat in each state.
So far from cleaning out the independents and minor party senators, a double dissolution is more likely to spawn more of them. The Government would be no better off than it is now.
Politically, there is some advantage for a government having a hostile Senate. A hostile Senate can often save the government from itself. It can ameliorate harsh legislation and change or block silly legislation. It can also be a scapegoat for a government which can argue that if only the crucial legislation had not been blocked all would be sweetness and light in Australia.
One could argue that if the Howard Government had never got a Senate majority Work Choices would never have passed and it might have had a better show at winning the 2007 election.
One could certainly argue that the Rudd Government might be saved from the silly fuel watch and alcopop legislation as it has been saved from poorly thought out luxury vehicle tax. If petrol prices continue to soar and binge drinking among the young continues amok, the government can argue that at least it tried.
In short, a double dissolution is of little value other than as a never-executed threat. There ought to be another way to resolve legislative deadlocks between the houses. I have often thought that twice-blocked legislation should be allowed to be passed by the House of Representatives alone following the subsequent election. But that is an argument for another day.