The icebreakers illustrate the story. This month China sent its third icebreaker, the new Ji Di, into the Arctic, following Xue Long (pictured) and Zhong Shan. One of them is in waters north of Alaska.
Meanwhile, the US Coast Guard icebreaker Healy abandoned its Arctic mission after an electrical fire and limped home on one engine to Seattle. The only other US Coast Guard sea-going icebreaker, the 55-year-old Polar Star, is undergoing a refit.
It is a similar story with submarines and other warships. China keeps building more and more ships more and more quickly, whereas the US lags behind its ship-building schedule – not for want of pouring in vast resources.
It is no doubt humiliating and alarming, particularly for US hawks.
Should we be alarmed? In one respect, yes. After all the naval arms race between Britain and Germany was one of the major causes of World War I – a preventable catastrophe. Similarly, Japan’s naval build-up was a key factor in World War II becoming global rather than European.
Naval arms races and wars have a ghastly habit of going together.
The icebreaking story has another part – the US reaction. Unlike China, the US can turn to allies, so it did so. The US has signed a joint agreement with NATO allies Canada and Finland to give it what icebreaking capacity it needs.
This ship-building contest, just like those before the two world wars, tend to push nations into military alliances or blocs. In turn, that generates suspicion and fear. Ultimately, that can lead us into what Hugh White calls sleepwalking into war.
The icebreakers illustrate the growing military strength of China. But that should surely be expected given the rapid rise of its economic strength.
In 1990 China’s GDP was just 7 per cent of the US GDP. Now it is 70 percent. In 1990 China’s GDP was a third of the GDP of Britain. Now it is six times that of Britain.
The US still spends three times as much as China on its military. China spends only 1.7 per cent of its smaller GDP on the military. The US spends 3.8 per cent. The trouble for the US is that China gets a lot more bang for its military buck than the US which spends a large amount on salaries and benefits, including rehabilitation.
The result is that the US feels it is losing its top position. Its leaders feel they have to be seen to be doing something against this rapid Chinese production of military hardware. Both presidential candidates have pledged to retain primacy.
It presages a greater military build-up, and just like before World War I, the aligning of nations into blocs. AUKUS and the expansion of NATO have helped drive China into greater military co-operation with Russia, Iran and North Korea – causing further unnecessary alarm and suspicion in the US.
In this environment Australia has to be very careful. Australia is in danger of being put into a position where it gets little choice about being dragged into a war with China because of the close military integration with the US, particularly the stationing of US troops and military assets in Australia.
There is a good argument that Australia would be a more secure and prosperous if we had never joined the US in the wars it initiated in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq. Let us hope that we will not be saying the same thing about a conflict over Taiwan in decades to come.
Australia is also in danger of becoming a target because of the close integration with the US. In the past the idea of a Chinese invasion could be dismissed as laughable and therefore there was no realistic threat. The trouble now is that asymmetric and cyber warfare means there can be a serious threat without any invasion.
Nuclear-powered submarines might be a deterrent against something that is not going to happen – a Chinese invasion of Australia. But they will be no deterrent against a Chinese attack on Taiwan because China sees Taiwan as its own territory and no business of Australia or the US.
The danger lies not in the Chinese build-up but in the west’s response to it. The better response would be not to over-react and to accept that it is an inevitable result of China’s growing economic strength.
And in the meantime, we should address matters that can inflame tensions, particularly trade and the passage of vessels.
In the climate of an arms race, the danger is that a small incident at sea could escalate quickly.
An important preventative measure would be to review and revise the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. At present, China is a signatory but regularly flouts the treaty, whereas the US is not a signatory but agrees to abide by it.
Further, interpretations of the treaty vary because the treaty is not specific enough about the rights of passage of civilian and military vessels through the various zones that the treaty delineates. For example, China says military vessels must seek permission to traverse the zone 12 nautical miles from the coast. The US says military vessels can traverse within the zone without permission.
It is asking for trouble.
Greater clarity of trade rules and speedy resolution of trade disputes would also help. Tit for tat trade wars help no-one.
It would require engaging with China with no guarantee of success. But it would be better than sleepwalking to war without trying.
With China we need trade without dependency and deterrence without an arms race. It will require subtlety, nuance, and firmess rather than belligerence and grand-standing.
Crispin Hull
This article was first published in The Canberra Times and other Australian media on 27 August 2024.
I am not sure why you think a democracy (even an imperfect like the USA) is more likely to cause a war than a dictatorship; history and current events in south-east Europe would suggest otherwise.
The US Coast Guard, operators of the elderly icebreakers is a formal armed service although not within the Department of Defense (it is part of Homeland Security). Although two new icebreakers are under construction, their authorization by Congress has been long delayed. The USCG is traditionally been underfunded and is the ‘Cinderella” of the US military, although arguable one of the most useful.
That aside it does show how China and Russia are exerting their maritime power in the Arctic and Antarctic.
As for Australia’s tenuous position regarding the US alliance: the ADF could do very little if requested to assist in a Taiwan contingency. It is far too small – we could probably offer up to 10 warships of varying capabilities and perhaps a squadron to F-35s, with supporting elements.
The US is far more interested in Australia’s real estate as a base, as i did during the Pacific War.
We can and should (according to the Defence Strategic Review) look after our own back yard in the Pacific. We have to think about the next 10 years until we (might) get a nuclear submarine capability.
At this point the US may well lean on us to augment their submarine operations in the South China Sea against China and the Australian Government will have a hard time avoiding this request